I bridge science, product, and go‑to‑market.
A decade translating science into adoption taught me that trust is the actual product. This site sits beside my CV: things I have built, a business I co‑run in AI, and the questions I keep coming back to.
Part portfolio, part field note, and a little of the life around the work, with a preference for the honest version over the polished one.
I was trained as a medicinal chemist, which is a long education in one question: is this claim actually true? Commercial work since 2017 has taken biosensing, contract research, and IoT software into markets where a wrong claim costs more than a lost deal. I now build my own products with AI, and the question has not changed.
A PhD supervisor, a CEO who has hired and led scientists, and the managing director of a software firm. Each links to the full letter.
A new class of guanidinium iminosugars built to inhibit glycosidases with a selectivity natural‑product inhibitors rarely achieve. Three first‑author papers. Selective versus merely potent is the thread through everything I have built since.
Glycosidases sit at the center of how cells process sugars: when they fail, disease follows. My doctoral work designed and synthesized a new class of guanidinium‑bearing iminosugars, chemical tools built to inhibit these enzymes with a selectivity that natural‑product inhibitors rarely achieve.
I am a domain expert who ships software, not a career developer. I design the product, set the architecture, and direct Claude Code and Claude Design as the execution layer: they write most of the code, I read it, question it, and decide what ships. The judgment about what to build, what is safe to rely on, and what is honest to claim stays with me.
The method is visible in the work: a Postgres design where rating data and commerce data live in separate schemas, and the build fails if rating code imports commerce code, with unit and end‑to‑end tests in CI enforcing that boundary, a headless‑Chrome PDF pipeline, MCP connectors, and a multi‑tenant white‑label architecture that re‑skins one codebase per client. I did not hand‑write all of it. The architecture is mine: the schema design, the enforced boundary between rating and commerce logic, the test strategy, the tenancy model. I read what ships, and I reject what I cannot justify. The same shape recurs across the work: retrieve, bind every claim to a source, validate, decide, and choose in advance how the thing should fail. The domain changes; the architecture does not.
From 2023 I had been noticing that the way I formed judgments at the bench seemed transferable, and I wanted to test two things: whether that translated into software, and whether opportunity recognition inside my own domain would work in one I did not know.
I took a one‑year contract on purpose rather than a permanent role. The alternative on the table was a purely commercial seat, which would not have answered either question. th[is] would: fast‑growing, real customers, and an open question about how to prepare for things going wrong. I spent the year on strategy, risk and commercial structure, working closely with strong engineers, and it settled what I wanted settled, that the gap between a domain expert and an engineering team closes if you learn the tools yourself instead of talking about them. Then I started building.
We were buying kits and chemicals from Wako, part of Fujifilm, for the assay work. What I noticed was a company repositioning itself into life sciences, which meant it would eventually need instruments, and a contact whose own kit sales would grow if that happened, which gave him a reason to carry it upward. Over about two years and four substantive meetings it reached their headquarters and an agreement to show our instrument on their official stand at Messe Düsseldorf. The holding wound up before the show, so nothing was signed beyond that. The prevailing view internally was full independence; I thought a staged partnership was the faster route into both instrumentation and diagnostics.
The SPR instrument line originated from Metrohm, and under a continuing arrangement Metrohm routed SPR‑interested customers to us. Technical support was split by domain, biochemistry on our side, electrochemistry on theirs, with joint attendance at customer sites depending on the problem. Jan Castrop ran that relationship himself before handing it over, and I took on onboarding, installation, training, application support and continuity across four continents.
Alongside it I looked after the Scienion relationship in Berlin, travelling twice to deliver, retrieve and train, and taking them to the point of wanting to buy the instrument. I handled antigen supply quality with Surfix in the Netherlands, and translated our SPR assay onto the ForteBio platform as an independent verification method. For those years, the group's external technical relationships largely ran across my desk.
I performed the coupling chemistry and the assay development for the SPR technique, later for ForteBio interferometry as well, and took part in the bioassay work the rest of the lab was running. As the antigen design deepened the organic lab took on synthesis and the specialists took the hardest determinations. What I did throughout was sit between the chemists and the biologists. If an organic chemist designs the antigen, the biologist may not be able to use it. If the biologist specifies what they need, the chemist may find it unaffordable, unscalable, unsafe or simply not achievable. Somebody has to hold both and decide. Jan Castrop and I made those calls together, against the literature, what was commercially available, and whether it would scale.
Work ran with a research group and with research hospitals that had their own labs. The samples required were HIV‑positive and legally constrained to obtain, and the assay never reached commercial or regulatory validation. The group was wound down before it could. I would rather state that plainly than let the word “clinical” carry more than it should.
We had a stock of antigens and precursors that were dead ends for the assay work and would otherwise have been written off. I saw them as an asset that could fund the research still running. I built the commercial side of that from nothing: positioning, brand, pricing, the site and outbound. I prepared the offer for both materials and contract research. It did not reach revenue before the group closed. The recognition is what I would claim here, rather than the result.
The record below is chronological. As each era enters view it deposits its skills into the ledger, reading by reading; by the last era the whole stack sits together.
One arc: science → product → adoption. Doctoral medicinal chemistry, then taking science to market: SPR biosensing across four continents, product ownership, a CRO built from zero, and the first commercial hire at a 40‑person software company. Now building applied‑AI products end to end. Three executives have put this record on record.
{{ era.summary }}
Drug development has a standard that sounds obvious and is hard to meet: potency is necessary, but a compound without an acceptable safety margin does not become a medicine. Potency is the headline number, the thing that looks impressive on a slide. The margin is the harder question, and it is never only a matter of dose: it turns on what the compound does to a liver and a kidney, what it does alongside three other medications, and how much room sits between the exposure that helps and the exposure that harms. The field learned, through decades of expensive failures, to celebrate potency quietly and reserve judgment for everything that has to hold true afterwards.
Applied AI is at the potency stage of its story. The capabilities are real and improving, and most of the attention sits exactly there, on what the model can do. I hold my own work to the other standard: good deployment is judged by who is better off after it ships. That is the commercial test as well: in trust‑sensitive markets, capability becomes adoption only when people have reason to rely on it.